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Why Different Jurisdictions Do Not (and Should Not)
Adopt the Same Antitrust Rules
David S. Evans*
I. INTRODUCTION
"A single dish cannot serve the tastes of a hundred people," says an ancient
Chinese proverb. So it is with the rules for assessing whether practices engaged
in by firms with significant market power are anticompetitive. More than one
hundred countries have competition laws and most of them have government
authorities entrusted with enforcing those laws in the first instance. Yet these
jurisdictions are a varied lot. Some have emerged from decades of communist
rule while others have only recently privatized companies responsible for
substantial parts of the economy. Their legal institutions differ, as do perhaps
their tastes for dominant firms. It would be remarkable if a single dish of
antitrust rules could satisfy so many.2
This Article establishes the proposition that divergence is the norm for
antitrust rules. It argues that the quest for convergence is quixotic and the
disdain when another jurisdiction has a different rule than one's own is uncalled
for.3 Along the way we consider two beacons of divergence that appeared on
either side of the Atlantic at the end of 2008-the US Department of Justice's
* Executive Director, Jevons Institute for Competition Law and Economics, Visiting Professor,
University College London and Lecturer, University of Chicago Law School. Email:
david.evans@ucl.ac.uk. The author would like to thank, without implicating, Ken Heyer, Keith
Hylton and Lubomira Ivanova, and Randoph Tritell for helpful comments and Marina Danilevsky
and Dhiren Patki for excellent research help.
Keith N. Hylton and Fei Deng, Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical Analsis of the Scope of
Competition Laws and Their Effects, 74 Antitrust LJ 271, 272 (2007).
2 For a review of company policy around the world and its growth over time, see David S. Evans
and Frederic Jenny, Trustbusing Goes Global in David S. Evans and Frederic Jenny, eds, Trustbusters:
Global Competition Authoities Speak Out (Competition Policy International 2009).
3 The general approach taken in this Article applies to all antitrust rules including those involving
concerted practices and mergers. The Article emphasizes unilateral conduct because divergence is
currently the greatest there.
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report on unilateral conduct and the European Commission's enforcement
guidelines on abusive exclusionary conduct.
4
Jurisdictions would adopt different antitrust rules even if they all agreed on
the economic principles governing rules and adopted the same goal, such as
maximization of economic efficiency.5 This Article develops this general
proposition in the next two sections. Section II summarizes widely accepted
theory concerning how to design antitrust rules for maximizing a particular
objective related to competition in the market. Section III then shows how one
can apply that theory to design rules that are tailored to the particular
circumstances of a jurisdiction. It concludes that even if all jurisdictions had the
same black box for designing antitrust rules-one programmed with uniform
economic principles and a particular objective to maximize-differences in the
inputs of information and assumptions to the black box would lead to different
antitrust rules coming out the other end.
Sections IV and V examine the reports on single-firm conduct from
Washington, DC and Brussels, which come to very different places on the
enforcement spectrum. The US Justice Department report is based on an
explicit framework for designing antitrust rules. While one can disagree with the
rules advocated by this US authority, it is relatively easy to discern the
assumptions and analysis that led to them. The European Commission's
approach is less transparent and has scant consideration of the possibility that
competition authorities and courts make mistakes given the lack of complete
information for making a determination. Nevertheless, some of the divergence
between the two approaches likely results from objective differences between
these jurisdictions.6 The most important differences are the lack of significant
private enforcement in the European Community, and the prevalence of
dominant firms that were privatized by their member-state governments in
relatively recent times.
Divergence is hardly a happy state of affairs for companies that compete in
multiple jurisdictions. It is also a source of tension among competition
authorities that are working from different rulebooks, as they jointly regulate the
game of competition among firms playing on a world stage. In fact, as Section
4 See US Department of Justice, Competition and Monopoly: Single Finm Conduct Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act (2008), available online at <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf>
(visited Apr 17, 2009); European Commission, Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in
Applying Article 82 EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings (2008),
available online at <http://ec.europa.eu/compedtion/antitrust/art82/guidance.pdf> (visited Apr
17, 2009) ("Guidance Report").
5 The terms "maximize economic efficiency" and "maximize social surplus" are used equivalently.
6 For an analysis that reaches a similar conclusion see Ken Heyer, A World of Uncertainy: Economics
and the Globali7ation ofAntitrust, 72 Antitrust L J 375 (2005).
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VI argues, individual jurisdictions will adopt competition rules that are
suboptimal from a global perspective. They will take into account the
maximization of social surplus within their jurisdictions but will not necessarily
account for adverse spillovers-what economists call "negative externalities" 7 -
on other jurisdictions through rules that hinder the ability of firms to operate
multinationally. Nevertheless, the convergence of antitrust rules across
jurisdictions is not optimal either. A social planner who sought to design
competition rules to maximize global economic efficiency would find it optimal
to tailor rules to different jurisdictions based on local circumstances even after
accounting for externalities. As with many issues involving a world composed of
sovereign nations the pragmatic question is how to reduce negative externalities
while respecting each jurisdiction's right to maximize its own objectives.
Section VII concludes with the observation that convergence should not
be seen as a desirable end in itself. Instead, competition authorities should seek
antitrust rules and enforcement measures that balance their local needs against
the costs of divergence to competition by multinational firms in a global
economy. That would also move the discussion away from jingoistic claims of
superiority. Moreover, by focusing attention on convergence, some
commentators seem to have lost sight of one of the most remarkable
developments of that last decade: the emergence of a global antitrust community
with many shared values and a common language.
II. THE THEORY OF OPTIMAL ANTITRUST RULES
As Sir John Vickers, the former chairman of the Office of Fair Trading,
has observed, antitrust is "judicious regulation to bring out the best in laisseZ -faire. "'8 In market-based economies, governments typically defer to the
competitive process in which rivalry among firms is counted on to ensure
efficient outcomes for society. Sometimes that process results in firms acquiring
significant market power or even monopolies, and antitrust seldom stands
squarely in the way of that happening. Rather, competition policy "referees" this
rivalry. In deciding whether certain behavior is "out of bounds," it relies on
7 An externality refers to an effect that an individual action has on others. A positive externality
results when one actor's actions benefit another's. For example, a homeowner who maintains a
nicely landscaped property will benefit her neighbors. A negative externality results when one
actor's actions harm another's. For example, a factory emits a foul odor that offends people who
live in close proximity.
8 John Vickers, Competition Economics, 3 Annual Public Lecture of the Royal Economic Society (Dec
4, 2003), available online at <http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared-oft/speeches/speO5O3.pdf> (visited
Apr 17, 2009) (emphasis in original).
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various rules.9 A competition authority is often the umpire in the first instance
although its decisions can be appealed to higher courts.10 The rules themselves
tend to evolve over time based on changing interpretations of original statutes,
authority decisions, and court judgments.
Government regulation is typically outcome oriented. For example, public
utility regulation usually seeks to achieve the greatest output from firms at the
lowest possible cost to the consumer. That has led to very specific rules
concerning pricing, investment, and other aspects of the business. Banking
regulation mandates specific practices to ensure the safety and soundness of the
financial system, as well as the prevention of various practices that might harm
consumers. That is not the case with competition policy, which does not, as a
general matter, dictate or second guess most decisions of firms-even the
dominant ones that are its principal subjects. Unlike most sports, the rules for
the game of competition say little about how the game should be played, only
how the game should not be played. The rules identify certain foul practices,
although with varying degrees of particularity.
Competition policy results from a two-step process. The first step
involves drawing a boundary between practices that are clearly lawful or
unlawful. The second step entails deciding whether particular practices, at or
near those boundaries, are lawful. The first step begins with the adoption of a
competition law through legislation such as the Sherman Act or through
constitutional provisions such as Articles 81 and 82 of the European
Community ("EC") Treaty of Rome. 12 It has not ended there, at least in the US
and EC. The boundaries change as authorities and courts consider more cases,
as learning advances, and as views on the robustness of markets shift. Thus the
US moved some coordinated practices from the clearly unlawful side of the
boundary to the boundary itself, where they could be evaluated under the rule of
reason. The EC has resisted condemning supra-competitive pricing by dominant
firms even though Article 82 specifically allows the authorities and courts to do
so.13 Over time, the location of the boundaries for competition and the rules for
assessing fouls evolve.
9 David S. Evans and Keith N. Hylton, The Lawful Acquisition and Exerdse of Monopoy Power and its
Implications for the Objectives ofAntitrust, 4 Competition Poly Ind 203, 208 (2008).
10 That is not true for the US, in which most antitrust litigation is private, as discussed below.
1 Evans and Hylton, 4 Competition Poly Intl at 205 (cited in note 9). The distinction is somewhat
similar to that between rules and standards in the law and economics literature. See Louis
Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Anaysis, 42 Duke L J 557 (1992).
12 Treaty Establishing the European Community (1997), arts 81-82, 37 ILM 56, 93-94 (1998).
13 Evans and Hylton, 4 Competition Poly Ind at 222-23 (cited in note 9). It is unclear whether the
Commission will continue to adhere to this policy.
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Optimal control theory provides a general framework for considering the
design of competition policy.' 4 It involves devising rules that maximize the
return from a system over time. A car is an example. Engineers design the gear-
shift ratios to maximize car performance as measured on a number of
dimensions. These ratios are simply regulations for what gears to use at various
speeds for the system. The financial system is another. Macroeconomists design
changes in the money supply to maximize the long-term performance of the
overall economy based on a variety of factors such as inflation and
unemployment.
In the case of competition policy, the optimal control problem concerns
designing a set of rules that maximizes the present discounted value of some
outcome of the market, total economic well being for example, subject to a
variety of constraints, such as those imposed by the legal system. The solution to
an optimal control problem generally entails sacrificing some short-run
efficiency from the system in return for longer-term efficiency. The US antitrust
laws reflect this solution in permitting firms to obtain and exercise significant
market power. This choice reflects a tradeoff between short-run welfare losses
that result from the exercise of market power and the long-run welfare gains that
result from profits encouraging investment and innovation that promotes
economic efficiency.
Statistical decision theory provides specific guidance for designing rules.
15
It involves making the best decisions in the presence of uncertainty over many
of the factors that influence the optimal decision. To illustrate the approach,
consider a health system that is designing a screening test to determine if a man
is likely to have prostate cancer. The health system may want to maximize the
overall well being of people in the system over time. However, it faces
uncertainty: it is not possible to detect prostate cancer with perfect accuracy
through noninvasive tests. Moreover, even when a man has prostate cancer,
there is uncertainty over how long it will take to become a health risk because it
is a very slow-growing cancer. In designing the test, the health system must take
into account two types of errors, each of which has costs. The test will have
14 For a general discussion, see Donald E. Kirk, Optimal Control Theory: An Introduction (Prentice-Hall
1970).
15 A rule in this case involves deciding between two alternatives, such as which fork in the road to
take. For a general discussion, see Howard Raiffa and Robert Schlaifer, Applied Statistical Decision
Theory (Harvard 1961). Richard Posner first introduced this approach to the analysis of laws in
1973 and Frank Easterbrook applied it to antitrust in 1984. Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J Legal Studies 399 (1973); Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Limits of Anitrust, 63 Tex L Rev 1 (1984). US courts have adopted elements of
the decision-theoretic approach explicitly in a number of antitrust cases, beginning with Matsushita
Electnc Industrial Co Lid v Zenith Radio Corp, 475 US 574 (1986).
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"false positives," which show that a man has prostate cancer when he does not.
False positives lead to costly further tests such as biopsies, and also cause anxiety
on the part of the patient. The test will also have "false negatives," which show
that a man does not have prostate cancer when he does. That error results in the
cost of having to treat a more serious prostate cancer condition later in life and
possibly the premature death of the patient. The decisionmaker thus faces a
tradeoff between the cost of false positive and negatives. Calibrating a test to
reduce the frequency and the overall costs of false positives necessarily increases
the frequency and the overall costs of false negatives. In the example, if the
health system increases the threshold for screening for prostate cancer, it will
reduce the cost of biopsies and false alarms, but it will increase the cost of
treatment for those who have prostate cancer later and increase the number of
premature deaths. 
16
A basic insight of statistical decision theory is that the optimal decision rule
depends on the cost and frequency of mistakes. Obviously, all else being equal,
one should design rules to avoid mistakes that are especially costly. An
important but subtle finding concerns testing for conditions that occur rarely in
the population. Consider the case in which 20 out of 20000 men (0.1 percent)
have prostate cancer. Suppose we entertain a test that results in false positives 5
percent of the time and false negatives 5 percent of the time. The application of
the test would result in 1000 men (0.05 x 20000) who do not have prostate
cancer being subject to biopsies. It would fail to detect prostate cancer in one of
the 20 men who do (0.05 x 20). One might argue that the cost of the mistaken
biopsies is worth saving the one man who really does have prostate cancer. But
suppose the combination of anxiety and the biopsy procedure results in a fatal
heart attack for one out of 1000 men. Then we would conclude that the cost of
false positives is too high and we should accept a higher rate of false negatives.
The application of statistical decision theory to the design of rules of
competition practices involves numerous considerations. To begin with, what
does competition policy seek to optimize? Let us assume for the sake of
argument that it is long-run social welfare. If we knew for certain that a
particular practice increases or decreases long-run social welfare, the problem
would be easy. But we do not know this for a variety of reasons. The economic
theory about the effect of that practice on welfare may conclude that the answer
depends on various facts and assumptions and only some of the facts that would
16 The tradeoff between false positives and negatives is enshrined in criminal law with the
Blackstone ratio: it is better to let ten guilty men go free than for one to suffer. It is implemented
in criminal law in a variety of ways including having the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of
proof. See William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries ch 27 (Chicago 1979).
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help us determine this are known while others are uncertain." The decision-
makers-the competition official, judges or jurors-who process these facts
may simply make mistakes. Thus, we would want to know a priori the likelihood
that a particular kind of practice is bad and the cost of making a mistake-a false
positive or negative in applying the test. Many factors would help us estimate
these. Are there reasons to believe that this practice is commonly used in the
market in ways that harm social welfare? Would condemning the practice harm
welfare because it is efficient and because there are few alternatives to it? Also,
we would want to recognize feedback effects between the legal system and the
market. Significant investments in detection and deterrence may discourage
enough "bad practices" that there is a higher likelihood that the remaining
practices are not bad. Lastly, any analysis of the socially efficient rule would
require a consideration of the costs to the legal system and to the subjects of
that rule of complying with it. Authorities and courts must spend more
resources to apply complex rules and businesses must spend more resources to
ensure compliance with complex rules.
Statistical decision theory usually relies on "Bayesian" analysis which,
roughly speaking, involves making predictions based on a combination of prior
beliefs-which could come from past experience-and the facts at hand. In the
case of competition policy, given the lack of certainty over many key factors, the
"priors" have a significant influence on rules and their applications. If one
believes that competition abuses are common, one would likely conclude that
the optimal rules should take a relatively stringent approach toward business
practices. If one believes that unfettered markets generally maximize social
welfare, then one would likely conclude that optimal rules should tilt against
intervention. In practice, prior beliefs are often unstated and seldom backed with
evidence, as we will see later in this Article.
III. THE DESIGN OF RULES FOR A JURISDICTION
Competition authorities and courts can rely on certain economic principles
regardless of their particular situations. The benefits of the invisible hand and
the risk of men of the same trade conspiring against the public are universal
laws. Demand curves slope downward whether one is in Beijing or Brussels. The
checklist of facilitating practices for cartels works most everywhere. Modern
antitrust embraces the discipline of economics, and concepts drawn from this
social science form an important part of the lingua franca for the competition
community globally.
17 See Heyer, 72 Antitrust LJ 375 (cited in note 6).
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Other factors may differ across jurisdictions, however, and this section
highlights several critical ones.
A. OBJECTIVES
Competition regimes could, for example, adopt different objectives. A
consensus seems to have emerged, however, that antitrust should ultimately
benefit consumers through lower prices, greater output, and better products, and
that antitrust should not protect firms from competition except insofar as it
benefits consumers. 1 In the words of EC Commissioner Kroes: "When we
strive to get markets working better, it is because competitive markets provide
citizens with better goods and better services, at better prices."' 19 The Chinese
Anti-Monopoly Law that was enacted in August 2007 and implemented in
August 2008 has also adopted consumer welfare as its goal.20
The US and the EC-and other countries that have adopted elements of
these approaches-have had competition policy regimes that over long periods
of time are consistent with their attempting to maximize long-run efficiency by
balancing the benefits of the short-run adverse effects of the exercise of market
power on prices and output against the long-run beneficial effects of the
prospect of market power on stimulating innovation and investments. That
balancing effort is seen in the fact that these regimes do not prevent firms from
acquiring and exercising significant market power, except in particular
21circumstances.
Factors that are unique to a jurisdiction can still color the common
objective to advance consumer welfare. The EC competition laws were adopted
as part of a treaty that was designed to create a common economic area. The
European Commission and the courts have been sensitive about business
practices that restrict trade or otherwise create economic differences among
18 See Einer Elhauge and Damien Geradin, Global Competition Law and Economics (Hart 2007).
19 European Commission, Report on Competition Poliy 2006, 3 (Foreword by Neelie Kroes), available
online at <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/annual-reports/2006/part2_en.pdf> (visited Apr
17, 2009).
20 Interview by Shujuan Feng with Mr. Ming Shang, Director of the Anti-Monopoly Bureau,
MOFCOM (Oct 8, 2007), available online at <http://financel.jrj.com.cn/news/2007-10-
08/000002754887.html> (visited Apr 17, 2009) (Transcript is in Chinese.). For a discussion of the
Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law and protecting consumer welfare, see also Xinzhu Zhang and
Vanessa Yanhua Zhang, The Animonopoy Law in China: Where Do We Stand?, 3 Competition Poly
Intl 185 (2007).
21 See Evans and Hylton, 4 Competition Poly Ind at 204 (cited in note 9). For analysis of why
antitrust policy should not limit the ability of dominant firms to "extract" the benefits of their
position, see Dennis W. Carlton & Ken Heyer, Appropriate Antitrust Poligy Towards Single-Firm
Conduct (Economic Analysis Group, Discussion Paper No EAG 082, 2008), available online at
<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/pubic/eag/231610.pdf> (visited Apr 17, 2009).
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member states in ways that are not relevant to the highly integrated US
economy. The Chinese competition law accounts-one can argue whether
appropriately so-for the significant role that government control and state-
owned companies play in the economy.
B. LEGAL REGIMES
Legal regimes differ across jurisdictions in ways that could affect the
likelihood and the cost of errors as well as the extent of anticompetitive
practices. These differences reduce the extent to which administrative agencies
are responsible for the enforcement of competition laws. In the EC and most
other jurisdictions, the enforcement of the competition laws rests primarily with
a competition authority which investigates possible violations of the laws,
decides whether a violation has taken place, and imposes fines and remedies on
companies that have engaged in violations. The alleged victims of violations of
the competition laws have limited ability to pursue claims in court and limited
ability to obtain awards of damages. 22 In the US, by contrast, about 95 percent
of antitrust cases are filed by private plaintiffs who can seek treble damages.
23
This contrast results in a remarkable difference in the level of enforcement.
In 2006, the European Commission issued fourteen statements of objections
based on Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, while the US Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission took a total of forty-one enforcement
24
actions in non-merger-related cases. However, that same year, 986 new civil
22 The EC and some of its member states have begun to make way for some private actions, but
most proposals provide for only limited use of class actions and no proposal, to my knowledge,
considers providing for multiple damage awards or other incentives to spend money to bring
cases. In many jurisdictions, the lack of multiple damages, the rule that the loser must pay
litigation costs, and the lack of effective class litigation mechanisms make it unlikely that private
actions will become significant vehicles for enforcing the antitrust laws. See, for example,
Christopher Cook, Private Enforcement of EU Competition Law in Member State Courts: Experience to
Date and the Path Ahead, 4 Competition Poly Intl 3 (2008); Assimakis P. Komninos, The Road to the
Commission's White Paper on Damage Actions: Where We Came From, 4 Competition Poly Ind 81
(2008); Renato Nazzini and Ali Nikpay, Private Actions in EC Competition Law, 4 Competition Poly
Intl 107 (2008).
23 Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, available online at
<http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5412007.pdf> (visited Apr 17, 2009).
24 In 2006, the European Commission issued fourteen statements of objections based on Articles 81
and 82 of the Treaty. Directorate Generalfor Competition AnnualActiviy Report 2006 4, available online
at <http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/synthesis/aar/aar2006/doc/comp-aar.pdf> (visited Apr 17,
2009). In 2006, the Department of Justice antitrust division filed forty-five total criminal and civil
cases in federal district court, of which ten were merger cases, and the Federal Trade Commission
brought six enforcement actions challenging a variety of anticompetitive conduct in the non-
merger area. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Annual Report on
Competition PoLig Developments in the United States, available online at
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antitrust cases were filed in federal courts in the US. 25 Few private actions were
filed in the EC during that period. While few hard data are available and any
conclusion is necessarily tentative, it would appear that the financial cost of
antitrust enforcement for companies is significantly higher in the US than in the
EC. First, in the US legal regime, companies bear the direct legal costs plus
opportunity costs of employees responding to extensive discovery requests.
Second, companies bear the cost of treble damages (which is factored into
settlements) for private litigation in addition to the fines imposed by the US
Department of Justice. Third, companies face class action lawsuits which
increase their financial exposures and tend to induce settlements.
The likelihood that businesses will engage in anticompetitive practices
depends in part on the probability that they will be caught and in part on the
punishment they will face. Although further research is needed to compare the
levels of enforcement efforts between the US and the EC, it would appear that
the EC legal regime invests fewer economic resources in the detection of
anticompetitive practices, since it has minimal private actions and does not make
up for that with a significantly higher level of government enforcement. Overall,
it would appear likely that the expected financial cost of antitrust litigation for
firms, including fines and damages and firm resources for responding to
discovery, is higher in the US than in the EC.27
These differences, though, also affect the likelihood and cost of errors in
complex ways. The far larger volume of cases in the US enables its courts to gain
much more experience with antitrust matters than their counterparts in the EC.
The American courts likely benefit from that learning in deciding cases and
fashioning rules, both of which reduce the likelihood of errors. US companies
<http://www.ftc.gov/bc/international/docs/usann07.pdf> (visited Apr 17, 2009). These
comparisons do not include cases filed by EC Member States or by State Attorneys General in the
US.
25 According to the 2006 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the US
Courts, 986 new civil antitrust actions, both government and private, were filed in the federal
district courts in FY 2006. Annual Report on Competition Polio Developments in the United States (cited
in note 24). Note that many US private actions are dismissed and most are ultimately settled
before reaching trial.
26 A comparison of private enforcement in the EU and US shows that in fifty years of EC law there
have been twelve successful actions and twelve unsuccessful actions (not counting settlements, as
there is no public record of them). Denis Waelbroeck, Actions For Damages For Breach of EC
Competition Law, Presentation (2006), available online at <http://www.imedipa.com/files/
downloads/Dennis%20Waelbroeck%20slides.ppt> (visited Apr 17, 2009). See also the discussion
in Nazzini and Nikpay, 4 Competition Poly Ind at 107 (cited in note 22).
27 There is nevertheless remarkably scant information available on the overall costs of private
antitrust litigation which includes the costs of the litigation, treble damage awards that have been
upheld on appeal, and settlement costs. There is not enough information available to estimate
even crudely the expected cost of antitrust litigation to American firms.
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may also have greater certainty concerning the likely outcome of challenges.
However, private cases in the US that survive various procedural hurdles
ultimately are decided by lay jurors. That fact, combined with the common use
of class action lawsuits in the US, makes antitrust cases highly risky for
businesses sued there. More importantly, to the extent that businesses account
for the possibility that courts may mistakenly condemn procompetitive business
practices and impose significant costs on them, they will curtail those
procompetitive practices and thereby reduce economic efficiency over time. The
US Supreme Court has pointed to the possibility of such chilling effects in
several recent decisions that have made it more difficult for cases filed by
antitrust plaintiffs to reach juries.
28
The EC, on the other hand, relies on an administrative agency staffed
mainly by well-educated career civil servants to determine whether firms have
violated antitrust laws. That expertise suggests the EC agency will make fewer
mistakes than the jury-based process in the US. However, there are other
institutional differences that might lead in the other direction. The Directorate
General for Competition ("DG Competition") at the European Commission
investigates cases and makes the decision in the first instance on whether there
has been a violation. The lack of separation between the judging and
prosecutorial functions results in an insular process that allows little learning
from outside review. The European courts give the Commission a great deal of
deference. That is most apparent in unilateral-conduct cases. The European
courts have never completely overturned a Commission decision on Article 82
in the fifty-year existence of EC antitrust.29 That fact does not bode well for the
likelihood and cost of errors as criticism is such a vital part of learning.
C. PRIOR BELIEFS ON ANTICOMPETITIVE BUSINESS
PRACTICES
The legislators, courts, and competition authorities that design competition
laws will come to their task with different views on the extent of the problem
with which they must deal. Those views will have been based on both objective
and subjective considerations. These are likely to differ across jurisdictions.
30
History matters here. Economies in which more or less laissez-faire
competition has ruled for long periods of time will likely have different market
28 See, for example, BellAtlantic Corp v Twomby, 550 US 544 (2007).
29 See Christian Ahlborn and David S. Evans, The Microsoft Judgment and its Impl'cationsfor Competition
Poliy Toward Dominant Firms in Europe, 75 Antitrust L J 3 (2009); Damien J. Neven, Competition
Economics andAntitrust in Europe, 21 Econ Poly 741, 762 (2006).
30 Also see Heyer, 72 Antitrust LJ 375 (cited in note 6).
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structures and sets of ingrained behavior than economies that have only recently
embraced markets after long periods of state ownership or central planning.
Many countries have only recently ended state ownership of businesses and
introduced competition into sectors such as electricity, telecommunications, and
transportation. Previously state-owned firms have significant market power that
is not necessarily the result of innovation or investment, or the result of their
being especially efficient. Several countries have only recently adopted public
policies that condemn price fixing. The Japanese economy is still dominated by
interlocking business interests and a culture of cooperation among businesses. 3 1
As recently as two decades ago, some large European economies did not
specifically outlaw cartels.
32
Ideology matters too. Policymakers may have varying degrees of faith in
the ability of largely unfettered competition to yield the right outcomes or in the
ability of governments to make better decisions than the market. The EC
Enforcement Guidelines state that "exclusionary conduct... can normally not
be justified on the grounds that it also creates efficiency gains." 33 That may be
based on a view that rivalry advances consumer interests in the long run even
though it may lead to some short-run inefficiencies. French President Nicolas
Sarkozy has asked, "Competition as an ideology, as a dogma, what has it done
for Europe?" 34 That reflects a belief that state guidance of industry, and the
promotion of national or European champions, is superior to the market for
delivering benefits to consumers. By contrast, US Supreme Court Justice Scalia,
in a decision that was joined by five other justices, observed that the pursuit of
monopoly profits "induces risk taking that produces innovation and growth., 35
While one can debate the relative merits of these positions, it is important to
recognize that each view may have been influenced by historical experience and
the state of competition in the economy, among other factors.
31 See, for example, Michael L. Gerlach, Alliance Capitalism: The Social OganiZaion of Japanese Business
3-6 (California 1992); Masahiko Aoki and Ronald Dore, The Japanese Firm: The Sources of Competitive
Strength 310-49 (Oxford 1994).
32 See Christopher Harding and Julian Joshua, Regulating Cartels in Europe: A Study of Legal Control of
Corporate Delinqueny 24-26 (Oxford 2003). The UK, Ireland, France, Estonia, Hungary, Romania,
the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia have only recently adopted criminal sanctions for cartel activity.
See Nicole Kar, Fabio Falconi and Priya Sahethevan, Recent Developments in Cartel Enforcement at EC
and UK Levels: Adjusting the Mix of Carrot and Sticks, 2 Global Competition Poly 1, 7 (2008).
33 European Commission, Guidance Report 29 at 12 (cited in note 4).
34 Competition Has Served Europe Well; Sarko!7 Has Not, Financial Times (une 25, 2007), available
online at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/85a2d268-2346-1 idc-9e7e-OOOb5dfl0621.html> (visited
Apr 17, 2009).
35 Verikon Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V Tninko, LLP, 540 US 398, 407 (2004). Scalia was
joined by Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, O'Connor, and Rehnquist, with Souter, Stevens, and
Thomas concurring on procedural grounds that did not reach the substance.
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D. THE SOURCES OF DIFFERENCES IN RULES ACROSS
JURISDICTIONS
Let us suppose that each jurisdiction was trying to use the principles of
optimal control and statistical decision theory to maximize long-run economic
efficiency. One could imagine these principles as being contained in a software
program. Designers of rules would input the sort of information described
above that helps determine how best to regulate the competitive process. The
software program would return the best set of rules.
Even though each jurisdiction is, by assumption, pursuing the same
objective and is using the same software to design its rules, it is likely that the
optimal rules would differ among jurisdictions simply because the inputs into the
design algorithm differ. One would expect significant differences between
regimes that rely mainly on administrative bodies to enforce the laws, and
regimes that rely mainly on plaintiffs that have been harmed by anticompetitive
practices to sue in court. One would also expect differences based on the
political and economic history of the jurisdiction. We would therefore expect
divergence at a point in time. That divergence could diminish over time as state
control or ownership of industry recedes into the past and if the degree of
competition across jurisdictions becomes more similar. But so long as the legal
regimes differ, we would not expect full convergence in competition rules.
By the end of 2008, following several years of discussion and debate, the
US Department of Justice and the European Commission released, within three
months of each other, recommended approaches towards assessing whether
firms have engaged in unlawful single-firm conduct. The reports illustrate the
divergence between the US and the EC. Our task in the next two sections is to
relate how the different results could reflect objective differences in the
circumstances of the two regimes rather than fundamental differences in
principles.
IV. THE US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT ON SINGLE-
FIRM CONDUCT
The Justice Department's analysis of unilateral conduct is based on two key
premises which it argues are grounded in US antitrust jurisprudence.36 First,
robust competition in free markets allocates resources efficiently and spurs
36 The US Federal Trade Commission issued a statement signed by three Commissioners that
disagreed sharply with the conclusions of the Justice Department report. See Statement of
Commissioners Harbour, Leibowit, and Rosch on the Issuance of the Section 2 Report by the Department of
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innovation. Antitrust policy should prevent unilateral conduct that harms the
competitive process but not prevent aggressive competition-including
aggressive competition by firms that have significant market power. Second, it is
difficult to distinguish business practices that reduce economic efficiency from
ones that increase it. Antitrust policy should err on the side of not discouraging
efficient behavior because of the high long-run and economy-wide costs of
doing so. Given these two premises, the Justice Department endorses various
specific rules concerning particular kinds of exclusionary and predatory
practices. It also argues for a general rule that the courts should conclude that
conduct is anticompetitive only when the anticompetitive effects are
substantially disproportional to the procompetitive effects.
A. THE CONFLICTING ROLE OF MARKET POWER IN
PROMOTING STATIC AND DYNAMIC COMPETITION
The Justice Department's report summarizes a long history of antitrust
jurisprudence which recognizes the role of market power in promoting
economic growth. Although the competitive process is a game of skill, it has the
risk and reward features of a lottery. Most bets do not pay off. The winners
therefore must expect to receive a prize to entice them to place a bet. In the
market system, the prize for the entrepreneur is obtaining, if they are successful,
enough market power to compensate for the risky investments of capital and
effort they have made. Although the Sherman Act makes it unlawful for a firm
to monopolize or attempt to monopolize, US courts have held, beginning with
the 1911 Supreme Court decision in Standard Oil,37 that it is not unlawful to have
a monopoly. In the 1945 Alcoa decision, Judge Learned Hand summarized the
state of the law with the oft-quoted line that "[t]he successful competitor, having
been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins."38 The
Supreme Court noted in Grinnell in 1965 that monopolization must be
"distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident."39 Most recently, the Supreme
Court concluded in Trinko that
[t]he mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of
monopoly prices, is not only lawful; it is an important element of the free-
market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices-at least for a
short period-is what attracts "business acumen" in the first xlace; it
induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth.
37 Standard Oil Co of New Jersg v United States, 221 US 1 (1911).
38 United States v Aluminum Co of Ameica, 148 F2d 416, 431 (2d Cir 1945).
39 United States v Grinnell Corp, 384 US 563, 571 (1966).
40 Trinko, 540 US at 407.
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The underlying premise of US antitrust law which the Justice Department
endorses is that the pursuit of monopoly power spurs investment and
innovation and that the exercise of monopoly provides the necessary rewards for
success. The task of antitrust is to ferret out business conduct that interferes
with this dynamic competitive process.
41
B. THE PROBLEMS OF IDENTIFYING ANTICOMPETITIVE
UNILATERAL CONDUCT
According to the Justice Department, determining whether business
conduct is harmful is a difficult task. It has become a harder task over time as a
result of economic learning, which suggests many unilateral practices the courts
presumed to be harmful in fact serve various efficient purposes. Economic
theory has found that various practices directly benefit consumers, or solve
distortions in the market that indirectly benefit consumers. For example,
"[e]xclusive dealing can enhance efficiency by aligning the incentives of trading
partners, by preventing free riding, and in other ways." 42 Many of these
practices, such as tying, must yield efficiencies of some sort since firms without
significant market power routinely engage in them. Moreover, empirical studies
have found little evidence that many unilateral practices are generally harmful.
The Justice Department does not deny that certain predatory and
exclusionary practices could "harm the competitive process." However, in
considering rules, it relies on statistical decision theory to argue for erring on the
side of assuming that practices are procompetitive. In its analysis of bundled
discounts, for example, it concludes that
the Department believes that the risk of false negatives posed by employing
the safe harbor is insufficient to warrant further consideration of conduct
that comes within the safe harbor, given the administrative costs of
proceeding, the risk of erroneous condemnations of conduct, and perhaps
most importantly, the potential chilling effect on legitimate price
discounting.
44
The "belief' stated in the paragraph is fundamental to the Department's
conclusions about how to design the rules for the game of competition.
41 See Carlton and Heyer, Appropriate Antitrust Pofiy Towards Single-Firm Conduct (cited in note 21).
42 US Department of Justice, Competition and Monopoly at xi (cited in note 4).
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C. SUBSTANTIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY TEST
Given these two premises, the Justice Department report proposed various
screening tests for assessing whether particular types of conduct, such as
predatory pricing, harmed the competitive process. These tests provide for safe
harbors which give businesses greater certainty that certain practices cannot be
challenged. They also effectively place the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff
to demonstrate that the conduct in question is anticompetitive. Unilateral
business practices, even when conducted by firms with significant market power,
are assumed to be procompetitive unless shown to be otherwise.
When the courts do not have a specific rule in place for certain conduct,
the Justice Department advocates that they only condemn conduct if "its likely
anticompetitive harms substantially outweigh its likely procompetitive
benefits."'45 That contrasts with current judicial practice, which relies on an
effects-balancing test that condemns conduct when the anticompetitive effects
are not offset by procompetitive effects. The Justice Department justifies this
test on statistical decision theory considerations. In particular, the test
"recognizes that the cost of legal rules that erroneously condemn procompetitive
conduct likely will be higher and more persistent than the cost of rules that
erroneously exonerate anticompetitive conduct."
46
D. RULES AND PRIORS
Statistical decision theory forms the spine of the Justice Department
report. The Justice Department is clear in stating its prior beliefs about
anticompetitive conduct and its risks to the competitive process. It believes that
markets generally work, that much of the conduct that the courts have found
unlawful in earlier decisions generates efficiencies, and that the costs of wrongly
condemning certain business conduct significantly outweigh the costs of
wrongly allowing certain business conduct. The US Supreme Court has endorsed
similar prior beliefs in a number of decisions, most recently in its opinions in
47 48 49 50 51Trinko, Leegin, Weyerhauser, Credit Suisse, and Twomby.
45 Id at 45.
46 Id.
47 Trinko, 540 US 398 (2004).
48 Leegin Creative Leather Products v PSKS, Inc, 127 S Ct 2705 (2007).
49 Weyerbauser Co v Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co, 549 US 992 (2006).
50 Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v Bilng, 551 US 264 (2007).
51 Twomb#, 550 US 544 (2007).
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Some of the Justice Department's views are supported by evidence that,
while arguable, is at least tangible. There is considerable economic theory and
empirical work indicating that conduct-such as tying-that courts had
presumed to be questionable is common and usually efficient. Other views are
expressions of opinion for which there is no objective evidence.52 The Justice
Department's report repeatedly asserts that the cost of false positives outweighs
the cost of false negatives. But it does not offer any empirical support for that
proposition and, while one can offer arguments about whether this proposition
is likely to be true or false, there is no systematic evidence either way.
The Justice Department and the courts have relied on beliefs concerning
the market to fashion competition policy in their antitrust jurisprudence. These
"priors" were not based on empirical data but on an inchoate combination of
practical experience and opinion. Knowing what these priors are allows us to at
least understand why the Justice Department has adopted the views that it has
and provides us with the opportunity to at least question these priors.
V. THE EC ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES ON ARTICLE 82
The European Commission released a seventy-two page draft discussion
paper in December 2005 that provided a framework for analyzing exploitative
abuses under Article 82; such abuses are approximately equivalent to
monopolization under US laws. The draft discussion paper was to serve as the
basis for guidelines. Three years later, after a time of controversy both in and
outside DG Competition over how to deal with unilateral conduct, the
Commission issued a twenty-six page document entitled "Guidance on the
Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 EC Treaty to
Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings." The purpose of
this document, unlike the earlier one, is to "provide greater clarity and
predictability on the general framework of analysis"53 which the Commission
uses in deciding whether to bring an action. There are no guarantees that the
Commission will follow the approach in the guidelines in drafting its decisions
or in arguing appeals before the Community Courts. The Commission does not
adopt an explicit statistical decision-theoretic framework. Therefore, one must
read between the lines to uncover the premises and beliefs behind the rules.
52 Some observations are presented as fact even though they appear to have no empirical support.
In discussing bundled discounting, the Justice Department asserts: "Bundled discounting is
common, usually benefits consumers, and generally does not raise antitrust concerns." A footnote
in support of this claims that "discounts having a retroactive feature" are commonly used by
firms that lack market power. US Department of Justice, Competifion and Monopoy at 91 (cited in
note 4). The reference does not support that claim and in my experience-no substitute for
empirical study-this is not true.
53 European Commission, Guidance Report 2 at 4 (cited in note 4).
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Before considering the Commission guidance report in more detail, it is
important to emphasize that it marks a significant advance in the treatment of
unilateral conduct in the EC. The case law of the EC courts concerning Article
82 has been based largely on a series of rules that make certain kinds of
unilateral conduct by dominant firms per se unlawful. As with price fixing, the
courts have assumed that if a dominant firm engages in the conduct it must be
harmful. No further analysis was necessary. Moreover, the EC courts have
tended to find practices that harm rivals unlawful to the extent that they lead to
a more concentrated market structure. Their analysis is influenced by the
German "ordoliberal school" of the 1930s, which argued that competition law
should make dominant firms "act as if' they were in competitive markets.
54
Although couched in terms of guidance for enforcement priorities, the
Commission report departs from the case law in two significant ways. First, it
makes the prevention of harm to consumers the preeminent purpose of
competition policy by announcing it "will focus on those types of conduct that
are most harmful to consumers. 5 5 Second, it rejects helping competitors that
are less efficient than the dominant firm. Its analysis of pricing abuses is guided
by the "efficient competitor test" which identifies anticompetitive practices
largely by determining whether they would tend to drive firms that are as
efficient as the dominant firm from the market.56 These are welcome
developments. Unfortunately, at other points, the Commission rejects modern
learning that should educate antitrust rules in all jurisdictions.
A. THE ROLE OF DYNAMIC COMPETITION AND EFFICIENCY
The EC Guidance Report appears to take a different view on the role of
market power in stimulating dynamic competition than does the Justice
Department report. It begins by making the observation that "it is not itself
illegal for an undertaking to be in a dominant position and such a dominant
undertaking is entitled to compete on the merits."57 The EC Guidance Report
does not explain why that is the case, nor does it endorse the US view that such
limitations would reduce long-run economic efficiency and ultimately harm
consumers by removing incentives to invest and innovate. Moreover, it leaves
open the possibility that the Commission may decide to intervene, as it can
54 Ahlbom and Evans, 75 Antitrust LJ at 17-19 (cited in note 29).
55 European Commission, Guidance Report 5 at 4 (cited in note 4).
56 Id, 24 at 11.
57 Id, 1 at 4.
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under Article 82, if firms engage in exploitative abuses such as charging
excessively high prices.
58
The Commission's analysis of refusals to supply illustrates its views on the
role of market power in promoting investment and innovation. It acknowledges
that imposing an obligation to supply "may undermine firms' incentives to
invest and innovate and, thereby, possibly harm consumers" and tempt rivals to
"free ride on investments made by the dominant undertaking."59 However, it
reaches a different conclusion than does the unanimous US Supreme Court in
Trinko under which it would be very difficult for a plaintiff to compel a
dominant firm to share its property. It also reaches a different conclusion, it
would seem, than the European Court of Justice in Magill,6° Bronner,6 1 and IMS
Health;62 under those cases a dominant firm can be compelled to share its
property only in "exceptional circumstances" that include showing the property
is indispensable to compete in the market.
63
The Commission, partly following the Court of First Instance's Microsoft
judgment, adopts a weaker rule. 64 The exceptional circumstances test, articulated
by the European Court of Justice in Magill, Bronner, and IMS Health, required that
for a refusal to share by a dominant firm to be an abuse, the property in
question had to be indispensable, and that the failure to provide it would lead to
the elimination of competition in a downstream market. According to the
Commission, "an input is indispensable where there is no actual or potential
substitute on which competitors in the downstream market could rely so as to
counter-at least in the long term-the negative consequences of the refusal."
65
58 The Commission has long had a policy of generally not pursuing excessive pricing cases. See
Christopher Bellamy and Graham Child, European Community Law of Competion 9-74 (Sweet &
Maxwell 5th ed 2001). The brief statement in the Guidance Report suggests that it may have had a
change of views on this. To the extent it does so, it would prevent firms from enjoying the fruits
of significant market power and result in a policy that is at odds with the longstanding US
approach as well as the approach it has adopted through prosecutorial discretion for many
decades.
59 European Commission, Guidance Report 74 at 22-23 (cited in note 4).
60 Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent Television Publications Ltd v Commission of the European Communities,
Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, 1995 ECR 1-743 (Apr 6, 1995) (refusal to license copyright
works, TV program listings).
61 Oscar Bronner GmbH and Co KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs, Case C-7/97, 1998 ECR 1-7791 (Nov 26,
1998) (access to home delivery system of newspapers).
62 IMS Health GmbH and Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH and Co KG, Case C-418/01, 2004 ECR I-
5039 (Apr 29, 2004).
63 European Commission, Guidance Report 77 at 23 (cited in note 4).
64 Microsoft Corp v Commission of European Communities, Case T-201/04, 2007 5 CMLR 11 (Sept 17,
2007).
65 European Commission, Guidance Report 82 at 24 (cited in note 4).
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The Magill and IMS Health cases required a further showing for intellectual
property that the refusal would prevent the appearance of a new product on the
downstream market. The Commission replaces this prong with a consumer
welfare test that compares the negative consequences of refusal to supply against
the negative consequences of the obligation to supply. The Commission says it
will consider claims by the dominant firm that the refusal is justified by its need
to obtain an adequate return. However, as discussed below, it will do so as part
of the "objective justification" defense for which the defendant bears an
essentially impossible burden of proof.
B. ERROR COSTS
The EC Guidance Report does not explicitly mention the possibility of
making mistakes that result in either ignoring anticompetitive conduct or
condemning procompetitive conduct, or the costs of these errors. However,
both its framework of analysis and the specific rules it advocates suggest that the
Commission wants to have great latitude in deciding whether unilateral conduct
is anticompetitive and that, to the extent it embraces the notion of error cost at
all, it is more concerned with under-deterrence. That is, it is more concerned
with false negatives.
The Justice Department report and US case law allow firms to demonstrate
that their conduct results in efficiencies. Under the standard balancing test, a
firm is not liable if the procompetitive benefits outweigh the anticompetitive
costs-that is, if the net effect on consumer welfare is positive. Under the
Justice Department's "substantially disproportional" test, a firm would not be
liable unless the anticompetitive effects were significantly greater than the
procompetitive ones. By contrast, the European Commission has adopted an
"efficiency defense" that would be rather difficult for a dominant company to
meet. The defendant "must provide all the evidence necessary to demonstrate"
that: (1) efficiencies result from the conduct; (2) there is no less anticompetitive
alternative that would provide the same efficiencies; (3) the efficiencies outweigh
any negative effects of the conduct on consumer welfare; and (4) the conduct
does not eliminate effective competition.
66
66 The fourth condition particularly distinguishes the EC from the US approach. The Commission
argues that "the protection of rivalry and the competitive process outweighs possible efficiency
gains." Neither the US case law, nor the Justice Department report, recognizes the preservation of
rivalry as a desirable goal in and of itself. The EC's Guidance Report adopts the "efficient
competitor" test in much of its analysis of specific rules. It is unclear whether the view on the
protection of rivalry for the analysis of objective justification involves the protection only of as
efficient rivals or of less efficient rivals as well. European Commission, Guidance Report 29 at 12-
13 (cited in note 4).
VoL 10 No. 1
Why Different Jurisdictions Do Not (and Should Not) Adopt the Same Antitrust Rules
The Justice Department Report endorses a variety of screens the US courts
have developed for unilateral conduct and proposes more. These screens are
supposed to sift out likely procompetitive business practices and make it difficult
for these good practices to face a balancing test that might reach the wrong
outcome. The Justice Department and US courts recognize that these screens
may inadvertently sift out anticompetitive business practices, thereby resulting in
false negatives. On the other hand, the Commission's Guidance Report does not
incorporate many of these screens. The predatory pricing test does not require
evidence of recoupment. The refusal-to-supply test does not require strict
indispensability. As a result, a far greater range of business practices are likely to
be subject to an ultimate decision as to whether they are anticompetitive under
the Commission's approach than under the Justice Department's approach
(which in large part is consistent with US case law).
C. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND PRIOR BELIEFS
The Commission's approach is consistent with its holding certain views
about markets and about the likelihood and cost of errors. First, the
Commission believes that rivalry among firms in the market is critical for
delivering benefits to consumers. Whenever it has the opportunity, it places its
thumb on the side of the scale that emphasizes static over dynamic competition.
Thus, rivalry trumps efficiency and the effects of mandating refusals to supply
on incentives to invest and innovate are dismissed. Second, the Commission
does not believe that the costs of condemning procompetitive practices are
significant. It does not mention error costs at all, which could mean that it
believes that it makes few mistakes. However, its overall approach and the
specific rules it advocates suggest that it wants to make sure that it sweeps up as
much anticompetitive conduct as it can and that it wants to minimize the
number of false negatives.
It would appear, therefore, that the European Commission bases its rules
concerning unilateral conduct on a different set of prior beliefs than does the US
Department of Justice. It is at least conceivable that both sets of prior beliefs are
reasonable for each jurisdiction and analysis of the desirability of either set of
rules needs to account for that possibility.
The US places great weight on dynamic competition. That makes particular
sense in an economy in which it is easy to start a business and in which there is a
culture of entrepreneurship and a well-developed venture capital industry that
bets on innovation. It makes less sense in the EC in which government
regulations have made it costly to start new businesses and in which the venture
capital industry is immature. Innovation-intensive industries such as information
technology and biotechnology have thrived in the US but not in Europe. The
new highly disruptive companies of the early twenty-first century, such as
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Google and Facebook, hail from the US and not from the EC. At the same time
the EC has had state-owned monopolies in a number of industries. Although
many of these monopolies have been privatized in the last twenty years,
competition has grown slowly. These differences likely lead to different
perceptions on the likelihood and cost of errors.
The other important difference between the US and EC concerns the cost
of mistakes. As noted earlier, because of the role of private litigation and class
actions, the US legal regime appears to create much greater financial exposure to
antitrust lawsuits than does the EC legal regime. A rule that expands the scope
for liability may therefore lead to greater costs of mistakes in the US than in the
EC.
One can argue whether the prior beliefs adopted by either the US or the
EC are correct for their respective jurisdictions. Perhaps the US places too much
weight on false positives and perhaps the EC places too little emphasis on the
role of significant market power in stimulating investment and innovation. But it
is impossible to have a sensible dialogue about the rules these jurisdictions have
adopted without analyzing the premises for those rules and considering whether
different rules are necessitated by objectively different circumstances in these
jurisdictions.
VI. CONVERGENCE IN A HETEROGENEOUS WORLD
Expressing an oft-stated concern about the divergence in the antitrust
policy towards unilateral conduct, two Canadian lawyers recently noted that,
"[a]s commercial activity becomes increasingly global and competition regimes
proliferate, the divergence in such laws is likely to produce considerable conflict
between jurisdictions, compliance burdens for business, and chilling effects on
economically beneficial conduct."67 The authors, like others, go on to argue for
an approach that largely follows the US in narrowing the circumstances under
which unilateral conduct is unlawful based on the rationale that unilateral
conduct cases are subject to significant errors that could chill procompetitive
conduct. Much unilateral conduct analysis is not, indeed, based on sound
economic principles in many jurisdictions including the EC.68 Nevertheless,
these advocates of convergence, like others, leap from the observation that some
jurisdictions have badly designed rules to the conclusion that jurisdictions should
have similar rules and ones that follow those of the US.
67 A. Neil Campbell and J. William Rowley, The Internationakzation of Unilateral Conduct Laws-Confict,
Comiy, Cooperation and/or Convegence, 75 Antitrust LJ 267, 267 (2008).
68 See note 66.
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The logical error is most apparent in their analysis of enforcement. They
observe that competition authorities pursue few unilateral conduct cases.
According to their data, the EC had a total of 87 cases in an economy of $13.7
trillion. They conclude from this statistic that abuses of unilateral cases are
uncommon and that unilateral conduct laws "should be designed and applied
with considerable caution, because even the chilling of a modest amount of
procompetitive activity could outweigh the benefits achieved from stopping
remedying rare anticompetitive situations."
69
That conclusion does not follow. First, the number of cases opened in a
jurisdiction reflects the resources available to the authority together with its
decision to allocate these resources to unilateral conduct cases. It does not
necessarily reflect the number of violations in the economy. Second, it is not
possible to compare enforcement efforts between the US and other regimes
without accounting for the role of private actions and treble damages in the US.
There were 1,004 antitrust cases filed in US district courts in 2006, 96 percent of
which were private cases, and the number of open cases during any year is a
multiple of that.70 These cases would appear to impose significant litigation costs
on the defendants as well as the prospect of treble damage awards, as discussed
above. Some of the cases are class action cases.7 1 The US does not necessarily
have more unlawful unilateral conduct, but it does have a legal regime which
provides significant financial incentives for plaintiffs to seek their day in court.
However, the end result is that the US as an economy (and controlling for size)
would appear, although this conclusion must be tentative given the lack of hard
data, to invest far more into the detection and punishment of unlawful
monopolization than the EC and perhaps many other jurisdictions. It is true as
69 Campbell and Rowley, 75 Antitrust L J at 277 (cited in note 67). The data is "based on surveys of
enforcement agencies," and it is therefore difficult to verify that the EC actually did have as many
as eighty-seven unilateral conduct cases open in 2006.
70 Although that number reflects all antitrust cases, not just unilateral conduct, it's still clearly a
significantly higher number and demonstrates the important point that most antitrust cases in the
US are private cases, not brought by the US government. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics
Online (cited in note 23).
71 The interchange fee controversy provides an example, although it is technically a coordinated
conduct case. The European Commission reached a decision adverse to MasterCard, which is on
appeal to the Community courts. See European Commission Decision COMP/34.579 Europay
(Eurocard-MasterCard) (Dec 19, 2007); MasterCard Press Release, MasterCard Files Appeal of
European Commission Decision (Mar 3, 2008), available online at <http://www.mastercard.com/us/
company/en/newsroom/prECDecisionAppeal.html> (visited Apr 17, 2009). MasterCard was
not subject to any fines. There is also an ongoing investigation of Visa. In the US, plaintiffs'
lawyers are seeking to represent a class of essentially all retail businesses in the US in a challenge
to the interchange fee rules adopted by MasterCard and Visa. The defendants in the case include
these two card networks in addition to many banks that issued credit cards. The plaintiffs are
seeking tens of billions of dollars in damages in addition to injunctive relief.
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noted above that Europeans are taking steps to increase private actions, but
without multiple damages or effective class actions, it is unlikely they will catch
up to the US in litigiousness.
In comparing antitrust regimes and in designing competition rules, the
difference in economy-wide investments in the detection and punishment of
unlawful conduct is the elephant in the room. The US conducts far more "tests"
of unilateral conduct than does the EC and therefore, with equally accurate tests,
it would have far more errors than would the EC. Moreover, with equally
accurate tests, a procompetitive business practice would be far more likely to be
challenged in the US than in the EC. Thus, the chilling effect on competitive
behavior would be greater in the US than in the EC. Holding the legal regime
constant, we would therefore expect that a court system that is conscious of
error costs would adopt rules that make convictions harder the greater the level
of enforcement effort; that is, it would sacrifice some false negatives to reduce
the number of false positives.
There is another potential error in the proposition that convergence is
needed because of the chilling effect on global firms. Although a great deal of
press surrounds multi-jurisdictional cases such as Intel and Microsoft, most of
the cases in jurisdictions around the world involve companies whose primary
place of business is in those jurisdictions. 72 To assess the chilling effect, one
would need to examine the likelihood that a global firm will face an investigation
involving unilateral conduct in multiple jurisdictions around the world. Given
the Canadian authors' observation that there are relatively few open
investigations73 and that many of these investigations do not involve global
companies, it would appear likely the probability of a multinational corporation
facing an investigation outside the US is low.
Uniformity in competition rules across countries certainly has value.
Businesses benefit from having to learn one set of rules and being able to follow
similar business practices in multiple jurisdictions. Those benefits are greatest for
business practices such as technological tying that cannot be easily tailored to
one country, and lowest for ones such as pricing that are often tailored to a
particular country anyway. Jurisdictions also benefit from uniformity and
imposing relatively low costs on businesses from competition-policy
enforcement. The competition-policy regime is one factor that businesses would
be expected to take into account in doing business in a jurisdiction. One would
expect that businesses would avoid jurisdictions that impose greater costs on
72 See A. Paul Victor and John C. Chou, United States Antitrust Junsdicion Over Overseas Disputes After
Title IV of the 1982 Export Trading Company Act and Timberlane, 10 Fordham Intl L J 1, 9-11 (1986)
(discussing the reluctance of US courts to accept cases with extraterritorial jurisdiction).
73 Campbell and Rowley, 75 Antitrust L J at Table 1 (2008) (cited in note 67).
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them from enforcement and greater costs as a result of their rivals being able to
engage in anticompetitive practices.
The debate about convergence is a worthy one to have, but the current
discourse is not as constructive as it could be. It is conceited for Americans to
criticize the European Commission for having overly aggressive enforcement of
unilateral conduct matters without considering how the differences in legal
regimes, enforcement and deterrence efforts, and economic history might have
influenced those choices. It is equally presumptuous for Europeans to criticize
the Supreme Court decisions that make it harder for plaintiffs to pursue
unilateral conduct cases without also considering that the Court is reacting in
part to a system that is more litigious than their system.
Statistical decision theory provides a rigorous framework for examining
competition-policy regimes. It can be used to examine whether different rules
are the result of different objectives, economic principles, prior beliefs, or
objective circumstances. It can then be used to consider the legitimacy of those
differences. Europeans sometimes point to the role of previously state-owned
companies in their more interventionist rules on refusal to supply. One can
evaluate whether that is a valid justification for a rule that applies to all
companies and whether there should come a time when previously state-owned
companies should be treated like any other company. Americans point to the
chilling effect of competition rules, yet there is little research on this matter. We
do not, for example, have data on whether the effective elimination of predatory
pricing cases in the US has resulted in more price competition or more
predatory pricing.
While heterogeneity is the norm for optimal antitrust rules, the adoption of
those rules by each jurisdiction is unlikely to be optimal from a global basis. We
can see this from a simple application of statistical decision theory.
Suppose we appointed a global social planner to design antitrust rules that
would apply to every jurisdiction in order to maximize global social welfare. The
social planner would take into account local circumstances as well as externalities
across jurisdictions in the enforcement of rules. Since most economic commerce
is local, the heterogeneity in local circumstances would result in heterogeneity in
the antitrust rules, for the reasons we have discussed above. The heterogeneity
of antitrust rules-im other words, divergence-is probably optimal.
Yet, if each jurisdiction selects antitrust rules to maximize social welfare
within its jurisdiction, it will not account for the spillover effects on other
jurisdictions. Suppose the jurisdiction enforces its antitrust rules against
multinational firms and these enforcement actions affect the business practices
of these firms outside the jurisdiction. That could happen directly if an
enforcement action has extra-territorial implications (as was the situation in EC's
case involving Microsoft), or indirectly if the uncertainty of enforcement actions
in various jurisdictions results in companies designing practices for the more
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restrictive regimes. Furthermore, firms will engage in some inefficient forum
shopping to pursue cases against their rivals in the more restrictive regimes.
Locally-adopted antitrust rules are probably sub-optimal.
As with other matters involving the economic relationships among
sovereign countries, the practical problem we face is trying to resolve negative
externalities among countries while respecting the rights of those countries to
pursue their own interests. Given the diversity of environments, there is no
compelling reason to believe that the answer for antitrust is having the same
rules. Rather, we need to identify the negative spillovers that result from
inconsistent rules and fashion solutions for them. Understanding why
jurisdictions have adopted particular rules will prove important in carrying out a
respectful dialogue.
VII. CONCLUSION
Over the last decade, most countries have adopted competition laws as
part of their move toward having market economies.74 Competition policy
professionals around the world speak a common language even though there
may be different dialects. The International Competition Network 7 -an
association of competition authorities-encourages the adoption of best
practices which necessarily results in convergence. There is far more similarity
among countries in their approaches to competition policy in 2009 than there
was even a decade ago.
There is, for example, far less difference between the EC and US
approaches to unilateral conduct today than existed ten years ago. A decade ago,
the European Commission followed the Community courts in having a form-
based approach to unilateral conduct, in ignoring competitive effects, and in
focusing more on harm to competitors than harm to rivals. It did not embrace
economic analysis and did not have a chief economist charged with looking over
competition policy. Brussels and Washington, DC, were very far apart even
during a Democratic administration and before the spate of Supreme Court
antitrust decisions. Today, the European Commission agrees that the purpose of
competition policy is to promote consumer welfare, it embraces economics and
has a chief economist, and it has moved in the direction of replacing a form-
based approach with an effects-based approach. Washington, DC, led mainly by
the Supreme Court reaching consensus decisions, has moved toward less
74 See Evans and Jenny, Trustbusting Goes Global (cited in note 2).
75 For an example of its efforts with regard to unilateral conduct, see ICN Unilateral Working
Group, Dominance! Substantial Market PawerAnalsis Pursuant to Unilateral Conduct Laws, available
online at <htrp://internaionalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/unilateralconduct/
Unilateral_WG_l.pdf> (visited Apr 21, 2009).
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stringent antitrust rules. Brussels has moved far more in the same direction, and
the US and EC regimes have thus grown closer together.
There remain significant divergences between the US and the EC and
other jurisdictions, especially over the laws concerning monopolization. Those
differences will narrow in part because competition policy has become a global
discipline. Professionals in different parts of the world are converging in their
views on the purpose of competition policy and the economic principles that
underlie it. They frequently meet and compare notes. That is being helped by the
emergence of global forums such as the International Competition Network,
where competition policy officials from around the world periodically meet and
form relationships. The differences will not disappear completely, nor should
they. Jurisdictions should adopt competition policy rules that adhere to general
principles but that take into account the specifics of their countries or regions.
To develop better competition policy worldwide and to develop desirable
convergence, we should be examining whether jurisdictions have adopted the
best rules given their circumstances and negative spillovers on other
jurisdictions.
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